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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, legislation and regulations in different countries of the 
world have raised questions about the conscientious objection of health care 
providers.  In Spain, the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary 
Interruption of Pregnancy Act of 2010 (Sexual and Reproductive Health Act)1 
recognizes the right to conscientious objection of professionals directly 
involved in the termination of pregnancy2 but also expands the possibility to 
perform abortions in relation to previous legislation.3  The application of the 
conscientious objection clause, however, leaves multiple questions open, and 
both the administration and the judiciary have reached different conclusions in 
its interpretation.4   
The discussion about distribution of powers regarding conscientious 
objection is also present in the United States.  In 2008, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) issued rules interpreting the Federal Health 
Care Provider Conscience Protection Statutes.5  The HHS modified the rules in 
2011, alleging that many of these norms were unnecessary because the federal 
statutes already included enforcement mechanisms.6  Another example of an 
unresolved question concerning conscientious objection is present in the 
controversy created around the religious exemptions of the HHS mandate 
under the Affordable Health Care Act.7 
The current uncertainty regarding the precise status of conscientious 
objection leads us to the present comparative study on conscientious objection 
in the area of health care providers.  Despite the vast number of publications 
related to conscientious objection in the United States, these publications have 
not approached the issue from a foreign legal perspective.  The purpose of this 
study is not to carry out an exhaustive survey of the American law on the 
subject but rather to seek some insight for the development of the institution in 
other countries.  The study of the relevant legal norms as well as their 
application in specific contexts can often spark ideas or suggest approaches to 
                                                        
1 Ley de Salud Sexual y Reproductiva y de la Interrupción Voluntaria del Embarazo 
[Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act] (B.O.E. 2010, 
55) (Spain). 
2
 Id. art. 19.2. 
3
 See id. art. 15. 
4
 For example, while the Health Care Services of Andalucía denied the right of family 
doctors to file conscientious objections, the courts overruled the administrative regulation, 
arguing that those doctors are, in fact, directly involved in the interruption of the pregnancy.  
See Marta Sánchez Esparza, Médicos de Atención Primaria Podrán Objetar en los Casos de 
Aborto, EL MUNDO (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/03/05/ 
andalucia_malaga/1330973795.html. 
5
 45 C.F.R. § 88.5 (2009). 
6
 Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection 
Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968, 9973 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
7
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 
1303(b)(4), 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  
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current problems in other jurisdictions, such as Spain.8  The abundant number 
of cases, statutes, and regulations in the United States may help to answer 
questions, such as whether conscientious objection is implicit in the freedom of 
religion, which branch of government should regulate it, and whether the right 
to conscientious objection clashes with constitutional provisions. 
Although American law has its origin in the common law system, the 
study of conscientious objection in the United States can still be relevant for 
the development of the institution in civil law countries.9  First, the U.S. case 
law is one of the richest in conscientious objection cases.  The diversity of 
material allows the subject to be developed with greater detail and precision 
than in other countries.  Second, in the area of human rights, the similarities are 
larger than the differences.  Because human rights are founded on the inherent 
dignity shared by all human beings, all members of the human family have 
equal and inalienable rights.10  Finally, the essential aspects of conscientious 
objection cases are common to Western countries.  While this study focuses 
the comparison mainly on Spain, the conclusions derived from it can also be 
helpful to other States, especially those that only have an incipient protection 
of conscientious objection. 
With these purposes in mind, Part I of this Article summarizes the 
modern understanding of conscientious objection in general and why it is 
worthy of special protection.  After studying the foundations of this institution, 
this Article will analyze how the different branches of government have 
protected conscientious objection and how this protection can be improved.  
Finally, the conclusions will show how the experience of the United States can 
help in the development of conscientious objection protection in other States. 
 
I. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: CONCEPTS AND JUSTIFICATION 
A. Concept 
 
 Conscientious objection can be defined as the request, inspired on 
religious or ethical convictions, of a private exemption that allows the objector 
to avoid an ordinary duty or to carry out an action prohibited by the law.  
 An objector can base his claims on religious or humanitarian ideals, as 
well as the ethics of his own community.11  In contrast with the terms 
                                                        
8
 For an explanation regarding the purposes of comparative studies, see MARY ANN 
GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 7–12 (3d ed. 2008). 
9
 For a general comparison between civil law and common law traditions, see JAMES T. 
MCHUGH, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 16–20 (2002).  For a comparison of 
Western and Eastern traditions, see GLENDON, supra note 8, at 4–9.  
10
 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at art. 7 (Dec. 10, 1948) (discussing equal dignity and rights for all human 
beings). 
11
 See HITOMI TAKEMURA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
TO MILITARY SERVICE AND INDIVIDUAL DUTIES TO DISOBEY MANIFESTLY ILLEGAL ORDERS 2 
(2009). 
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‘resistance’ and ‘civil disobedience’, conscientious objection is not always 
based on political reasons or a shared conception of justice.12  As Raz points 
out, “civil disobedience is a political act, an attempt by the agent to change 
public policies [whereas] conscientious objection is a private act, designed to 
protect the agent from interference by public authority.”13 
The request of an exemption presupposes the conflict between a 
general norm and the individual conscience.  This means that the norm must be 
currently applicable to the individual situation of the objector.  The opposition 
made by someone who is not under the factual scenario of the statute can be 
characterized as a political act or an expression of public opinion but not a 
conscientious objection.  As Bedau affirms, “the primary purpose of 
conscientious objection is not public education but private exemption, not 
political change but (to put it bluntly) personal hand-washing.”14  Many times, 
the objector also desires the amendment of the law, but this is only the 
secondary purpose of the conscientious objection.15  Reality shows that 
objectors can simultaneously look for an exemption as well as for the 
modification of legislation.  Being so, Navarro-Valls and Martínez-Torrón 
considered that it is more accurate to talk about two stages:  the individual 
ethical moment, identified with conscientious objection, and the collective 
political moment, known as ‘civil disobedience’.16  
 
 
                                                        
12
 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 369 (1971).  The term ‘resistance’ refers to a 
“forcible opposition or resistance to the government in power . . . as well as violent acts . . . 
aimed at dislodging those exercising political power.”  Kent Greenawalt, Conscientious 
Objection, Civil Disobedience, and Resistance, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 
105, 106 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008).  According to this definition, the 
goal and the motivation are always political.  There is an opposition to the whole of the 
existing legal order, or at least a relevant portion of it, but the ordinary means to change the 
law are inefficient or nonexistent.  As a result, the people decide to use force to overthrow the 
government.  Civil disobedience also has a political motivation but differs from resistance in 
several aspects.  First, it does not contemplate violence as a means.  Second, it has a narrower 
scope.  It only looks for the amendment of specific laws and not for the replacement of the 
government, showing respect for the ordinary political process.  Nevertheless, it is a requisite 
of civil disobedience itself that dissenters are ready to continue their opposition even when 
courts uphold the controversial norms.  Otherwise, they would not properly face 
‘disobedience’.  See Hugo A. Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, 58 J. PHIL. 653, 661 (1961). 
13
 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 276 
(1979).  
14
 Hugo Adam Bedau, Introduction, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 1, 7 (Hugo Adam 
Bedau ed., 1991).   
15
 Id.   
16
 RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS & JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, LAS OBJECIONES DE 
CONCIENCIA EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL Y COMPARADO 11 (1997). 
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B. Justification of Conscientious Objection: Rooted in Freedom 
of Conscience 
1. Jurisprudential Foundations 
 
All definitions of conscientious objection acknowledge that the 
objection is an exception to a general rule.  This feature makes it difficult to 
explain the nature of conscientious objection from the sole perspective of 
positive legal norms.  If the law orders something because it is essential for the 
fundamental interests of the State, how is it possible that the same legal order 
allows objections to that norm?  Is it reasonable to have a duty to do something 
and, at the same time, a right not to do it?  As Dworkin points out in Taking 
Rights Seriously, many lawyers accept that morality can justify disobedience, 
but they believe that the law cannot because the subsistence of society depends 
on the enforcement of the law.17  Thus, the question addressed in the following 
paragraphs will focus not on the morality but rather on the legality of 
conscientious objection.  
Different views on the nature of conscientious exemptions exist.18  On 
one hand, conscientious objection is, at times, considered a fundamental right 
that can be enforced in any case, even when the legislator does not recognize it 
explicitly.19  Among these views, a majority considered that this fundamental 
right derives from the free exercise or freedom of conscience.20  On the other 
hand, conscientious objection is sometimes viewed as a ‘subjective right’ in 
civil law terms.21  In this way, it is treated as being hierarchically inferior to a 
fundamental right.22  Consequently, if a conflict arises between rights, 
conscientious objection should yield in favor of the higher ranked right.23  The 
latter position perceives the legislature as the organism better suited to balance 
among the different interests at stake and to decide a priori when such a right 
can be recognized by the legal order and when it cannot.24  Other opinions 
consider conscientious objection only as a legal value—inferior to a formal 
right—that serves as a guideline to public powers, especially the legislature.  In 
order to respect these values, the ruler can tolerate certain exemptions that 
conflict with the general legal rule.  Nonetheless, from the point of view of the 
power-holder, these exemptions would be unbearable if everyone followed the 
                                                        
17
 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206 (1977).  
18
 See NAVARRO-VALLS & MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 16, at 19 (summarizing the 
different views on conscientious objection). 
19
 See id. 
20
 See id. 
21
 See id. 
22
 See id. 
23
 See id. 
24
 See id. 
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objectors’ example.25  In other words, conscientious objection would be a 
privilege—‘a grace’—derived from the legislature and not a constitutional 
right afforded to everyone.26  These different conceptions lead to wider or 
narrower protection of conscientious objection.  
The following paragraphs describe the different foundations of 
conscientious objection in international law, foreign jurisdictions, and the 
United States.  
2. International Law 
 
Although traditional interpretation of international law denied that 
freedom of conscience and freedom of religion included a right of 
conscientious objection, the doctrine has changed in recent decades.  Freedom 
of conscience consists of the liberty to believe in principles—especially ethical 
ones—according to which men shape their lives.  Therefore, the right to 
believe necessarily needs to include a right to behave according to those 
beliefs.  The purpose of conscientious objection is, precisely, to allow citizens 
to act according to their beliefs, even when the law contradicts them.  
The recognition of conscientious objection as an international human 
right, rather than a simple privilege, constitutes a revolution in the sovereign 
approach of the States.27  At the level of international organizations, both the 
United Nations (U.N.) Commission on Human Rights and the U.N. Committee 
on Human Rights have drafted resolutions asserting that Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (both 
recognizing freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) guarantee the right 
to conscientious objection, at least for military service.28  Additionally, Article 
10.2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantees 
the right to conscientious objection in general terms, not limited to a specific 
subject matter, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of 
the right.29  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reaffirmed 
                                                        
25
 See Yossi Nehushtan, Secular and Religious Conscientious Exemptions: Between 
Tolerance and Equality, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
243, 253 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008). 
26
 See Maria Teresa Weidner, Striking a Balance Between Faith and Freedom: Military 
Conscientious Objection as a Model for Pharmacist Refusal, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 369, 
373–74 (2008). 
27
 See Emily N. Marcus, Note, Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right, 38 
VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 510 (1998). 
28
 Conscientious Objection to Military Service, H.R.C. Res. 1995/83, ¶ 1, U.N. ESCOR, 
51st Sess., Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, at 246 (Mar. 8, 1995);  Conscientious 
Objection to Military Service, H.R.C. Res. 1993/84, ¶ 1, U.N. ESCOR,  49th Sess., Supp. No. 
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122, at 251 (Mar. 10, 1993);  Conscientious Objection to Military 
Service, H.R.C. Res. 1989/59, ¶ 1, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1989/86, at 141 (Mar. 8, 1989).  For information about the evolution in the 
interpretation of Article 18 of the ICCPR, see Marcus, supra note 27, at 515–17. 
29
 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10. 
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the obligation of the State members to ensure in their regulations the right of 
conscientious objection with regard to health and medical services, linking it to 
the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.30  
3. Foreign Law 
 
With respect to domestic foreign law, the case of Germany is of special 
interest.  Article 4 of the German Basic Law recognizes the freedom of faith 
and of conscience.31  Section 3 of Article 4 regulates the right to conscientious 
objection in the following terms:  “No person shall be compelled against his 
conscience to render military service involving the use of arms.  Details shall 
be regulated by a federal law.”32  Early interpretations of the courts considered 
that Article 4.3 allowed the conscientious objection to military service as a 
whole but not the refusal to participate in war in particular circumstances.33  
Nevertheless, in the case Germany v. N,34 the Federal Administrative Court of 
Germany (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) upheld the claim of a soldier who 
refused to take part in operations related to the war in Iraq, which he 
considered illegal and, therefore, against his beliefs.  In its reasoning, the Court 
maintained that freedom of conscience also applies to soldiers in active 
service, who “can rely on their basic right of freedom of conscience, which is 
distinct from the constitutional right to recognition as a conscientious 
objector.”35  The intent of the express recognition of conscientious objection 
for military service was to strengthen the general right to freedom of 
conscience, not to restrict it.36  Therefore, attending to the specific 
circumstances of the war in Iraq, the soldier should not be forced to obey the 
orders and should instead be offered alternative tasks unrelated to the ongoing 
conflict.37  This judgment shows how the right to conscientious exemption in 
Germany is based on the right of freedom of conscience, independently from 
                                                        
30
 PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, COUNCIL OF EUR., THE RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION IN LAWFUL MEDICAL CARE, Res. 1763 (Oct. 7, 2010), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1763.htm.  
Regarding the conscientious objection of health care providers under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, see Mark Campbell, Conscientious Objection, Health Care and Article 9 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 11 MED. L. INT’L 284, 286 (2011). 
31
 See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. IV (Ger.). 
32
 Id., sec. 3.  
33
 See Ilja Baudisch, Freedom of Conscience and Right to Conscientious Objection—
Refusal to Obey to Military Orders—Legal Ban on the Use of Force (Article 2(4) UN 
Charter)—Right to State Self-Defense (Article 51 UN Charter)—Neutrality of States in Armed 
Conflicts, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 911, 915 (2006). 
34
 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] June 21, 2005, 
120 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1455 (2005) (Ger).  The full text of the decision is 
available online (in German) at http://www.bverwg.de.  We follow the English text and 
analysis of it made in Baudisch, supra note 33. 
35
 Baudisch, supra note 33, at 912. 
36
 See id. 
37
 Id. at 911. 
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any express recognition in the German Constitution or statutes, and how the 
judiciary can extend its application to different scenarios.38 
Spanish law also sheds some light on the issue.  The Spanish 
Constitution only expressly recognizes conscientious objection for the case of 
military service.39  The Constitutional Court, however, justified the 
conscientious objection of the military in the right to freedom of conscience.40  
The Court states that “because the freedom of conscience is a realization of the 
freedom of thought, that the Constitution recognizes in article 16, it can be 
affirmed that conscientious objection is a right recognized explicitly and 
implicitly in Spanish Constitutional Law” without requiring an express 
recognition by Congress.41 
The Constitutional Court also expanded conscientious objection 
protection to other scenarios beside military service.  In decision 53/1985, 
regarding the constitutionality of the statute that decriminalized abortion in 
some cases, the Court observed that the right to conscientious objection  
exists and can be exercised with independence from the drafting 
of specific regulations.  The conscientious objection is part of 
the content of the fundamental right to freedom of ideology, 
religion and worship, recognized in article 16.1 of the 
Constitution and, as the Court has pointed out on different 
occasions, the Constitution is directly applicable, especially in 
the field of fundamental rights.42   
In addition, the Court recognized the right to conscientious objection in the 
decision 154/2002 regarding the refusal, based on religious beliefs of parents, 
to authorize a blood transfusion to their son43 and in the judgments 177/199644 
and 101/200445 with respect to public officials who refuse to participate in 
religious activities required at their work.  From the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, it is possible to conclude that freedom of conscience in 
Spain includes the right to conscientious objection.  The Spanish Supreme 
Court, in obiter dicta, reaffirmed that conscientious objection formed part of 
the freedom recognized in Article 16 of the Constitution.46  
The extension of this protection, however, should be examined case by 
case.47  It is difficult to talk of a general right to conscientious objection in the 
Spanish law because the Constitutional Court expressly rejected this idea in 
                                                        
38
 See id. at 915. 
39
 C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 30 (Spain). 
40
 See S.T.C., Apr. 23, 1982 (S.T.C., No. 15) (Spain). 
41
 Id.  
42
 S.T.C., Apr. 11, 1985, (S.T.C., No. 53) (Spain).  
43
 S.T.C., July 18, 2002 (S.T.C., No. 154) (Spain). 
44
 S.T.C., Nov. 11, 1996 (S.T.C., No. 177) (Spain). 
45 S.T.C., June 2, 2004 (S.T.C., No. 101) (Spain).  
46
 S.T.S., Apr. 23, 2005 (R.G.D., No. 2505) (Spain).  The Tribunal Supremo is the highest 
court of general jurisdiction in Spain. 
47
 S.T.C., Oct. 27, 1987 (S.T.C., No. 161) (Spain).   
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S.T.C. 161/1987.48  In that decision, the Court stated that conscientious 
objection of general effects means “the right to be exempted from the 
fulfillment of constitutional or legal duties because of their collision with their 
own beliefs, it is not recognized in our law or in any law, because it would 
mean the denial of the same idea of State.”49   
 Furthermore, the Spanish Supreme Court has recently held a stricter 
view of the protection of conscientious objection.  It has denied that 
conscientious objection is a necessary element of the freedom of religion 
recognized in Article 16 of the Constitution or that it is a general right with its 
own substance.
50
  This Court has also suggested that the possibility to submit 
conscientious objection should be narrower in the cases of legal obligation as 
opposed to duties established in administrative regulations.
51
  Moreover, the 
Court affirmed that public officials—and in a special way, judges—are subject 
unconditionally to the rule of law, no matter if they could be replaced in their 
specific case or there are alternatives to avoid damaging third-party interests.
52
  
Finally, the Court accepted that the legislature could expand the protection of 
conscientious objection to new scenarios but that protection in any case would 
only have a legal—as opposed to constitutional—rank.53  
4. The United States 
 
The cited international norms and case law of Germany and Spain show 
that conscientious objection in those jurisdictions relies on the fundamental 
right to freedom of conscience.  The case of the United States is quite different 
because its Constitution does not expressly mention freedom of conscience.  
Instead, the First Amendment contains two distinct religious clauses, the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.54  Despite the different 
wording, it is possible to interpret the provisions of the First Amendment as 
including liberty of conscience.  If this is the case, conscientious objection in 
American law can be found a reasonable justification on this freedom. 
Eighteenth-century writers from different Christian denominations 
agreed over some essential rights and liberties of religion, including liberty of 
conscience, free exercise, pluralism, equality, separationism, and 
disestablishment.  Among the works of these writers, the term ‘free exercise of 
religion’ is often used as a synonym of ‘liberty of conscience.’55  This liberty 
                                                        
48




 See S.T.S., May 11, 2009 (R.G.D., No. 3059) (Spain). 
51
 See id. 
52
 See id. 
53
 See id. 
54
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
55
 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1488 (1990); John Witte, Jr., The Essential 
Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 371, 405 (1996). 
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requires that “persons be exempt or immune from civil duties and restrictions 
that they could not, in good conscience, accept or obey,” words that sound like 
a definition of conscientious objection.56  From the history of the drafting of 
the Bill of Rights it seems clear that behind the religion clauses stood the idea 
of liberty of conscience, even if the word ‘conscience’ did not appear in the 
final version of the amendment.  As Feldman explains,  
 
The reasons for the Senate’s omission of the reference to 
conscience are not clear.  What is certain is that the notion of 
liberty of conscience was not being abandoned; rather, 
protection of free exercise and a ban on establishment, taken 
together, were thought to cover all the ground required to 
protect the liberty of conscience. . . .  No one involved in the 
debate over the religious clauses, or indeed anywhere in the 
eighteenth century American debates over state and religion, 
argued against liberty of conscience as a general proposition.  It 
was the theoretical basis for both religion clauses and remained 
so even after the word ‘conscience’ disappeared from the draft 
language.57 
 
 According to Witte, the language of the final version of the First 
Amendment protects conscience even more, because if “Congress cannot 
‘prohibit’ the free exercise, the public manifestation of religion, a fortiori 
Congress cannot ‘prohibit’ a person’s private liberty of conscience, and the 
precepts embraced therein.”58  McConnell also remarks that the term ‘exercise’ 
implies action, and its inclusion in the First Amendment “makes clear that the 
clause protects religiously motivated conduct as well as belief.”59  
 Not only scholars have given a wider interpretation to the constitutional 
protection of religion.  In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, the Supreme Court made reference to the term ‘freedom of 
conscience’.60  Furthermore, in military conscientious objection cases, the 
Court has expressly admitted the objection based on non-religious beliefs even 
when the statutes that granted the exemption only mentioned ‘religious training 
                                                        
56
 Witte, supra note 55, at 391–92. 
57
 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
346, 404 (2002).  See also McConnell, supra note 55, at 1488.  For an opposite view on the 
inclusion of a constitutional right of religious exemption, see Philip A. Hamburger, A 
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 915 (1992). 
58
 Witte, supra note 55, at 394.  
59
 McConnell, supra note 55.  The author adds that ‘religion’ is broader than ‘conscience’ 
because it includes the corporate or institutional aspects of religious beliefs.  Id. at 1490. 
60
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  
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and belief.’ 61  This is interpreted as recognition of freedom of conscience, 
beyond the protection of religion.62  
 Nevertheless, the protection of conscientious objection rooted in the 
religious clauses is controversial.  For example, in North Coast Women’s Care 
Medical Group., Inc. v. San Diego County, the California Supreme Court—
relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, Oregon 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith—held that a “religious objector has 
no federal constitutional right to an exemption from a neutral and valid law of 
general applicability on the ground that compliance with that law is contrary to 
the objector's religious beliefs.”63  In other cases, the courts have upheld the 
plaintiff’s claims.  For instance, in Stormans v. Selecky, the court found that the 
rules enacted by the Washington State Board of Pharmacy requiring 
pharmacies to deliver all prescribed medications, including emergency 
contraceptives, violated the Free Exercise of Religion.64  The challenged rules 
included multiple exemptions for secular conduct but did not contain 
exemptions for identical religiously motivated conduct.65  They did not justify 
the distinction in a compelling interest of the state, and consequently, the court 
concluded that the rules unconstitutionally targeted religious conduct.66  
Although Smith remains valid, to understand the current federal law on 
the subject, we also need to attend to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 (RFRA),67 which significantly limits the scope of the Court’s decision.  
This statute provides that the government may substantially burden religious 
exercise only in “furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and only 
if the burden constitutes “the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”68  Despite a partial overruling in City of 
Boerne v. Flores,69 RFRA remains valid on the exercise of powers by the 
federal government.70  Therefore, under current law, it is necessary to use a 
case-by-case analysis to determine whether the government is allowed to 
forbid a religious exemption from a neutral and valid law of general 
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 Id. at 340. 
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 N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 
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 See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  
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applicability.  In the cases regulated under RFRA, the general rule is that the 
person has a fundamental right to freedom of conscience that can only be 
limited by a compelling interest and the least restrictive means.  
 The refusal to perform an action based on deep individual beliefs does 
not constitute establishment of religion.  For instance, the refusal of a health 
care provider does not order the patient to conform to the physician’s belief or 
moral standards.  Even if the beliefs of the objector are based on religious 
grounds, the refusal does not force the patient to conform to the physician’s 
belief or morality.  On the contrary, it might protect the patient’s conscience as 
well.  For example, in Ward v. Polite, the refusal of a counselor to counsel on 
same-sex relations was considered by the court to protect both the freedom of 
conscience of the plaintiff and to avoid the imposition of the counselor’s 
values on the client.71  On the other hand, forcing professionals to act against 
their conscience seems to be closer to a violation of Free Exercise.  Using a 
similar metaphor to the one used by the Supreme Court in relation to freedom 
of speech in Tinker v. Des Moines, it can hardly be argued that health care 
providers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of conscience at the 
hospital gate.72  
 Besides the Free Exercise Clause, some voices start to suggest that 
conscientious objection claims might be grounded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.73  The autonomy logic behind the substantive 
due process cases could explain why there must be a constitutional right to 
refuse based on conscience.  As Rienzi suggests, this right would not be 
absolute, but the government will need to prove a sufficiently compelling 
interest forcing providers to act against their will and convictions.74  
5. Lessons from a Comparative Perspective 
 
 The previous sections suggest that in international law as well as in 
domestic law, there is a trend to protect conscientious objection.  In the case of 
the United States, the protection of liberty of conscience, at least of religious 
conscience, can be derived from the First Amendment to the Constitution.  The 
freedom of conscience in combination with the right to free exercise of religion 
translates into the right to act according to one’s religious beliefs.  From this 
starting point, it is reasonable to argue that conscientious objection in the 
United States can be grounded in the fundamental right of freedom of 
conscience.  
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 Despite the differences in the constitutional texts, some conclusions can 
be drawn in benefit of other legal systems.  If, in the case of the United States, 
it is possible to interpret the Constitution as protecting conscientious objection, 
a fortiori the protection of conscientious objection can be stronger in countries 
that explicitly recognize in their constitutions the freedom of conscience.  
Looking at practical difficulties in the interpretation of the First Amendment 
should encourage other legal systems to avoid such conflicts by strengthening 
their constitutional protection of freedom of conscience.  In other words, 
countries such as Spain and Germany should look at their constitutional 
protection of freedom of conscience to solve new cases of conscientious 
objection.   
II. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS: A 
PUZZLE BETWEEN CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATION, AND THE 
JUDICIARY 
 When we think of professions that deal with a high level of ethical 
decisions, the ones in the health care area immediately come to mind.  Their 
work touches sensitive issues dealing with the beginning and end of life, 
reproductive techniques, and privacy, among others.  However, the evolution 
of the rights discourse in the last few decades seems to have created conflicts 
between patients’ decisions and health care providers’ beliefs.  In this scenario, 
special norms regulating conscientious objection of health care providers 
appear to be necessary. 
A. Spain  
 
 The Sexual and Reproductive Health Act introduced an express 
conscientious objection clause in favor of professionals directly involved in the 
voluntary interruption of pregnancy.75  The statute that originally legalized 
abortion in Spain did not include any conscientious objection clause; the only 
recognition of such a right before 2010 appears in the case law of the 
Constitutional Court.76  From this starting point, the Sexual and Reproductive 
Health Act gives a stronger protection to conscience rights by incorporating an 
explicit conscientious objection clause.77  On the other hand, the wording of 
the exemption seems to narrow the scope of conscientious objection.  Although 
the decision 53/1985 of the Constitutional Court suggested that the right to 
conscientious objection existed and could be exercised without having to draft 
specific regulations,78 the new norms suggest that this right is limited to the 
terms of the legislation. 
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 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, supra 
note 1, art. 19.2. 
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 See B.O.E. 1985, 166 (Spain).  
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 See Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, 
supra note 1, art. 19.2. 
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 Article 19.2 of the Sexual and Reproductive Health Act refers to health 
care providers “directly involved in the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.”79  
The line between what is direct or indirect is blurry.  It is not clear whether 
anesthetists, radiologists, midwifes, or pharmacists, among others, are directly 
or only indirectly involved in abortion procedures.  For instance, an anesthetist 
could consider himself directly involved in the interruption of the pregnancy 
by providing his services to the woman during the proceedings and thus 
violating his conscience by participating in the performance of the abortion 
even though authorities consider that he is not.  
 Administrative authorities of Spain’s autonomous communities issued 
ordinances regulating the procedure of conscientious objection.80  Some of 
these regulations have tried to include exhaustive lists of professionals who can 
be considered directly involved in abortion and, therefore, can file 
conscientious objections.  For instance, the original version of the regulation of 
the Council of Health and Social Welfare in Castilla-La Mancha excluded 
family doctors from the list.81  The final version, however, omits any list of 
professionals.82  Another example took place in the community of Andalucía, 
where the Health Service required family doctors to inform patients about 
abortion and refer them to professionals who could perform those 
procedures.83  Courts quashed the regulation, affirming that family doctors are 
directly involved in the abortion process and thus are protected under the 
conscientious objection clause of the Sexual and Reproductive Health Act.84   
 Some regulations also added extra requirements to the exercise of the 
right to conscientious objection.  One that has caused controversy is the 
creation of a registry of conscientious objectors.  Professionals allege that the 
Sexual and Reproductive Health Act only requires a written communication of 
the objection to the official in charge of the respective health service and that a 
registry can lead to discrimination in their workplace against health care 
providers.85  The Superior Tribunal of Justice, however, rejected this claim, 
pointing out that case-by-case communication of conscientious objection 
would hinder the organization and provision of the public health services.86 
 Another question that arises from the Sexual and Reproductive Health 
Act is how to balance the right to conscientious objection of health care 
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 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, supra 
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providers with the rights of patients.  The Sexual and Reproductive Health Act 
states that conscientious objection should not undermine the access and quality 
of health services.87  Furthermore, Statute 41/2002 establishes that patients 
have the right to information.88  These two norms could force conscientious 
objectors to give information about abortion and to refer the patients to 
professionals that would be willing to perform them.  The problem is that this 
form of participation would still violate the conscience of those who believe 
that abortion involves the killing of an innocent human being.  The law, 
however, cannot determine the merits of differing religious precepts or the 
centrality of particular practices to a faith.89  This is especially relevant 
considering that the Sexual and Reproductive Health Act does not recognize a 
right to abortion but does recognize the scenarios where abortion should not be 
penalized.  
 It is undeniable that the Sexual and Reproductive Health Act is 
ambiguous about what constitutes access and quality of health services.  It 
would be a task for the judiciary and the administration to interpret these terms 
and harmonize them with the right to freedom of conscience.  The decision of 
the court of Andalucía already recognized that the right to conscientious 
objection involves the right to refuse giving information and referring 
patients.90  It will be interesting to see how the highest courts resolve cases 
involving the regulation of this issue.   
 In relation to the enforcement mechanisms of the right to conscientious 
objection, there are at least two available proceedings.  A person can file a 
complaint before specialized tribunals for administrative litigation 
(Contencioso Administrativo) against administrative regulations and reach the 
Superior Tribunal of Justice through appeal mechanisms.91  Additionally, the 
Constitution contemplates a special proceeding before the Constitutional Court 
known as amparo, which protects certain constitutional rights, including 
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 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, supra 
note 1, art. 19.2. 
88 Autonomy of the Patient and the Rights and Obligations with Regard to Information 
and Clinical Documentation, 40126-40132 (B.O.E. 2002, 274) (Spain). 
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 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).  In the 
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STATE & SUPREME ADMIN. JURISDICTIONS OF THE EUR. UNION [ACA EUROPE], 
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freedom of conscience.92  Although the study of the specific procedures 
exceeds the purposes of this Article, it is interesting to have this information in 
mind when the analysis moves towards the study of the protection of 
conscientious objection in the United States. 
 After this brief description of the protection of conscientious objection 
of health care providers in Spain, many questions remain.  One especially 
relevant to us is the question of distribution of powers:  Who is better suited to 
regulate conscientious objection?  It is reasonable to consider that 
implementation of conscientious objection requires some procedures and 
interpretation beyond the terms of Article 19.2 of the Sexual and Reproductive 
Health Act.  In fact, the Act establishes in its preamble that the recognized 
right to conscientious objection requires further development by the law.93  
This same disposition of the preamble, however, can be used to argue that it is 
Congress—la ley—and not the administration that is called to develop that 
complementary regulation.  This can be supported by Article 53.1 of the 
Constitution of Spain, which states that only the law, which in any case must 
respect the essential content, could regulate the exercise of the constitutional 
rights and freedoms.94  So far, it has been the local administration of the 
autonomous communities that has had an active role in these regulations.95  
This fact leads us to ask whether these regulations should come from a central 
or a local level, a subject related to federalism.  Finally, the role of the 
judiciary in the interpretation process remains in question.   
 While it is still too early to conclude how things will develop in Spain 
after the Sexual and Reproductive Health Act, the study of the situation in the 
United States—a country with somewhat similar problems and a long history 
of conscientious objection—can shed some light and experience on how things 
could turn out.  
B. The United States 
1. Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection 
Statutes 
 
 Since the 1970s, the United States has recognized special protection of 
conscientious objection for health care providers, especially under the group of 
statutes known as the “Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection 
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Statutes.”  This conglomerate of statutes includes the ‘Church Amendment,’ 
Section 245 of the Public Health Service Act, and the ‘Weldon Amendment.’96 
After the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,97 some federal 
courts interpreted that ‘state actors’—including hospitals that receive public 
funds—have the obligation to perform sterilization and abortion procedures.  
Examples of these interpretations are the decisions in Doe v. Hale Hospital 
(Massachusetts)98 and Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. (West 
Virginia).99  However, Roe v. Wade remarks that neither physicians nor 
hospitals shall be required to perform an abortion against their moral 
principles.100  
In the same year that Roe v. Wade was decided, Congress reacted to 
this controversy by enacting the first “Church Amendment.”101  This statute 
protects health care providers from discrimination by recipients of federal 
funds on the basis of their refusal to perform or participate in any lawful health 
service or research activity, based on their religious or moral beliefs.102  In 2011, 
the HHS described the purpose of the statute in a narrow way, explaining that 
its objective was “to make clear that receipt of federal funds did not require the 
recipients of such funds to perform abortions or sterilizations.”103  
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The Church Amendment Statute prohibits any public authority to 
require an individual—as a condition of a grant, contract, loan, or loan 
guarantee—to perform or assist in a sterilization procedure or abortion if these 
actions are contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.104  In the case 
of entities, the act bans the requirement of providing personnel or facilities for 
the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance 
of such procedure is prohibited by the entity on the basis of its religious beliefs 
or moral convictions.105  Additionally, the act prohibits discrimination in 
employment conditions or concession of grants among personnel and 
institutions, based on their availability or non-availability to perform lawful 
sterilization procedures or abortion.106  Furthermore, the document prescribes 
that no individual  
shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any 
part of a health service program or a research activity funded in 
whole or in part . . . by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, if the . . . activity would be contrary to his religious 
beliefs or moral convictions.107 
Finally, the statute prohibits the entities financed by federal funds from 
discriminating “against applicants for training or study because of [the] refusal 
of [an] applicant to participate on religious or moral grounds.”108 
 Complementing the ‘Church Amendment,’ the Public Health Service 
Act of 1996 regulates abortion-related discrimination in governmental 
activities regarding the training and licensing of physicians.109  In general 
terms, the Act provides that the federal government, and any state or local 
government that receives federal funds, may not discriminate against any 
health care entity on the basis of entity refusal to undergo or provide training in 
the performance of induced abortions, especially in relation to the accreditation 
of postgraduate physician training programs.110 
 Moreover, in 2005, an amendment inserted in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act gave more detailed conscience protection to health care 
givers.  The provisions have been reproduced in the Appropriations Acts of 
every year since.  The norms are known as the Weldon Amendment.111  The 
amendment not only bans discrimination itself—as the Public Health Service 
Act does—but also cuts funding for those agencies, programs, or governments 
that actually discriminate.112  Another important difference is that it defines the 
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term ‘health care entity’ as including not only individuals and hospitals but 
also maintenance organization and health insurance plans.113  It ends with a 
general clause that includes “any other kind of health care facility, 
organization, or plan.”114 
 In addition to these three statutes, we find the Affordable Care Act 
of 2010, which also includes norms concerning conscience protection.  Section 
1303(b)(4) of the Act establishes that “[n]o qualified health plan offered 
through an Exchange may discriminate against any individual health care 
provider or health care facility because of its unwillingness to provide, pay for, 
provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.”115 
 There are important differences between these statutes and the Spanish 
law analyzed in the previous section.  The Federal Health Care Provider 
Conscience Protection Statutes focus on the non-discrimination aspect of 
conscientious objection rather than on the positive action of the professional 
who wants to file a conscientious objection claim.  They presuppose that the 
individual can present his objection, but they go further by protecting the 
individual from the consequences that his objection could have.  Addressing 
the problem of discrimination in a more explicit way in the Spanish statute 
would help protect objectors from the dangers that they see in certain 
administrative measures such as the creation of the registry of conscientious 
objectors.  
2. Regulations of the Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 Although the Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection 
Statutes do not require promulgation of regulations to be interpreted or 
enforced, in 2008, the HHS issued regulations under the title “Ensuring that 
Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or 
Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law.”116  This 
regulation entrusted the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the HHS with 
responsibilities for the enforcement of the analyzed statutes.117  The regulation 
also provided norms related to the purposes of the statutory provisions, how to 
understand the terms of the statutes, the applicability of the same regulation, 
and requirements and prohibitions.118  It also added a special requirement that 
“all recipients of Departmental funds had to submit written certification that 
they would operate in compliance with the provider conscience statutes.”119  






 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
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The objective of this requirement was to create awareness about the rights and 
obligations created by the Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection 
Statutes.120  
 Controversy arose very soon.  Those who were against the 2008 HHS 
Rules considered them unnecessary because the statutes already provided 
enough mechanisms of enforcement.  Moreover, the regulation was seen as a 
threat to patient rights and informed consent.121  Additionally, opponents 
criticized the increase of administrative costs that was involved.  Finally, in 
February of 2011, the HHS partially rescinded the 2008 Rules with the aim of 
clarifying ambiguities.122  The new version states—in similar terms as the 
2008 version—that the purpose of the regulation is to provide for the 
enforcement of the Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection 
Statutes.123  Nevertheless, it eliminates the second paragraph of former Section 
88.1, which provided that “consistent with this objective to protect the 
conscience rights of health care entities/entities, the provisions in [Federal 
Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Statutes], and the implementing 
regulations contained in this Part are to be interpreted and implemented 
broadly to effectuate their protective purposes.”124 
The new version also eliminates the reference to definitions, 
applicability, and requirements, including the certification requirement.125  It 
keeps the OCR as the entity in charge of receiving complaints based on the 
Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Statutes.126  Nevertheless, 
it somehow weakens the complaints mechanism by changing the language 
from “to receive complaints of discrimination and coercion based on the health 
care conscience protection statutes and this regulation”127 to the words “to 
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receive complaints based on the Federal health care provider conscience 
protection statutes.”128 
The rescission of the 2008 Rules has been criticized by freedom of 
religion defense groups, who lament that the new regulation undermines the 
position of conscientious objectors.  Experts of the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty argue that the previous rules “offered detailed definitions and concrete 
examples to help health-care professionals and institutions know exactly what 
was protected. . . .  Instead, the revised rule now says that ‘individual 
investigations will provide the best means of answering questions about the 
application of the statutes in particular circumstances.’”129  The HHS now 
believes that “the approach of a case-by-case investigation and, if necessary, 
enforcement, will best enable the Department to deal with any perceived 
conflicts within concrete situations.”130  
The conflict between the 2008 Rules and the 2011 version brings up, 
again, the question of the role of regulations in the interpretation of 
conscientious objection statutes.  Both the 2011 HHS Rules and the regulations 
of the autonomous communities in Spain follow the trend to limit the scope of 
conscientious objectors rights.  Although it is difficult to draw a line between 
what is interpretation and what is limitation, it is important to keep in mind 
that administrative rules should not limit constitutional rights.  If conscientious 
objection is grounded in freedom of conscience, then the administration has to 
be especially careful in its regulation.  The different versions of the HHS rules 
might serve as an example of the discretionary power of administrative 
regulations.  From the American experience, other countries can learn of the 
importance of control mechanisms. 
3. Finding a Remedy: The Private Right of Action 
Problem 
 
One of the criticisms made regarding the drafting of the 2008 Rules 
was that the regulations were unnecessary because the statutes already 
provided enough enforcement mechanisms.131  Nevertheless, case law seems 
to refute this supposition.  
In Cenzon–DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital,132 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Church Amendment did not 
confer a private right of action to enforce the statute.  The case refers to Ms. 
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Cenzon-DeCarlo, a nurse, who was compelled to participate in a late-term 
abortion and was subsequently coerced into signing a form indicating her 
readiness to participate in future emergency abortions.133  As the court’s 
opinion in Cenzon-DeCarlo observes, the Church Amendment does not confer 
an explicit private right of action.134  It is true that federal courts have, in the 
past, implied rights of actions from statutes that do not expressly recognize 
them but only where there is “explicit evidence of Congressional intent.”135  
The other Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Statutes do not 
help either, because of their limited scope; the Public Health Service Act of 
1996 refers specifically to training programs of physicians whereas the Weldon 
Amendment is limited by its funding nature.  
 Besides the mentioned federal statutes, health care providers could use 
other general norms, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, to protect their 
conscience rights.  These norms prohibit discrimination against any employee 
in the terms and conditions of employment based on religious beliefs.136  From 
the study of Title VII case law, however, it seems difficult for health care 
providers to obtain a remedy under these provisions.  The Civil Rights Act 
considers that the employer can be exempted from the obligations of the statute 
if he demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee 
or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.137  
 In cases involving health care providers, the interpretation of the courts 
has been especially narrow.  For example, the case law seems to make a 
distinction between the protection of conscience of private employees and the 
one of ‘public protectors’, such as police, firefighters and public health care 
providers, giving the latter group a very narrow safeguard under Title VII.138  
Courts have affirmed that conscience beliefs of professionals of the public area 
should defer in favor of the state interest involved in the performance of their 
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work.139  This interpretation is too restrictive.  The law protects conscientious 
objections of other professions related to public interests.  One example is the 
protection of the conscientious objection of military professionals who have a 
contractual relation with the Armed Forces.140  Although this profession is 
closely related to the public interest of national security, the legal system still 
protects their conscience objections, accommodating their duties to non-
combatant service.  As in these cases, it should be possible to make 
accommodations when other public interests, such as public health, are 
involved.141  
Taking all this into account, it seems clear that conscience refusal in the 
health care field is not overprotected by federal law.  In this scenario, 
administrative regulations could still have a role to play, such as the regulation 
of the disputes resolution mechanism before the OCR.  Whereas complaints 
mechanisms at the administrative level, in terms of procedural economy, are 
probably the fastest way to resolve conscientious objection disputes, it is 
fundamental to keep open a judicial instance of review that can correct the 
arbitrariness of political decisions of the administration.  A mixed model can 
help, on one hand, to avoid the overflowing of workload of the judiciary and, 
on the other hand, to guarantee effective remedies, addressing the problems 
and fears of both the Spanish and American systems. 
4. State Statutes 
 
 At the state level, legislatures have also enacted statutes recognizing 
conscience exemptions in relation to reproductive services.  Forty-six states 
have enacted statutes allowing certain health care providers to refuse 
participating in abortion practices.142  Most of them extend the refusal 
provisions to institutions, although only fifteen recognize them in relation to 
private institutions; in the case of California, recognition is limited to religious 
institutions.143  Only Louisiana and Mississippi provide protection for all 
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health care providers and for all health care procedures and services.144  The 
States that do not provide any protection are Alabama, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont.145 
 Seventeen states have also enacted statutes allowing individual providers 
exemptions in the cases of sterilization, and sixteen extend the protection to 
institutions.146  Some states have also regulated the health care provider’s 
objection to provide contraceptive services.147  Even in the states where there 
is no explicit provision for conscientious refusals, non-discriminatory labor 
statutes can, at least theoretically, protect health care providers, banning 
discrimination based on religious beliefs.  
 In order to have an accurate idea of the current law at the state level, it 
is also necessary to examine judicial decisions interpreting these provisions.  In 
Valley Hospital Association v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska declared that the refusal statute that allowed hospitals to 
decline to provide abortions based on conscience reasons was unconstitutional 
because it involved a violation of the woman’s fundamental right to abortion 
grounded in the right to privacy of the Constitution of Alaska.148  Therefore, 
restrictions can only be justified by a compelling state interest and where there 
are not less restrictive means to achieve the objective.149  
 Other courts have given a broader protection to conscientious 
objection.  The Florida District Court of Appeal (Third District) decided to 
apply the ‘reasonable accommodations and undue burden test’ of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, although the state statute did not require it.  In Kenny v. 
Ambulatory Centre of Miami, Florida, Inc., Florida courts found that 
additional efforts to accommodate a nurse’s religious beliefs of not 
participating in abortion procedures did not constitute undue hardship in those 
circumstances.150   
 State courts have interpreted statutes as including a broader protection 
of conscience, not limited to religious beliefs.  One example is the Supreme 
Court of Montana in Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hospital, where Swanson, 
a nurse-anesthetist, refused to participate in a sterilization procedure based on 
her conscience beliefs, although she had assisted in other sterilizations 
before.151  The court determined that the statute did not allow distinction 
between religious or moral beliefs largely upheld or recently acquired.152  In 
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the words of the court, “[t]he right given by the statute is unqualified, 
irrespective of past participation.”153  
 The recent decision of the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit 
of Illinois in Morr-Fitz Inc. v. Blagojevich is of special interest.154  In this case, 
the court declared invalid an administrative rule155 that requires pharmacists to 
participate in sales of drugs, including emergency contraceptives.  The court 
established that the rule violates the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience 
Act.156  In the opinion of the court, the plain language of the statute makes 
clear that pharmacies and pharmacists are covered by the legislation.157  
Additionally, the rule violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution because it is neither neutral nor generally applicable.158  
The intent of the rule, as the evidence showed, was to stop pharmacies and 
pharmacist sale refusals based on religious grounds.159  Nevertheless, the rule 
allowed non-compliance based on secular reasons, such as “common sense 
business” reasons, other than religion.160  The court determined that this 
distinction between business reasons and religious ones showed a Free 
Exercise violation “because the Rule is neither neutral nor generally 
applicable.”161  The law is subject to the compelling interest test under the Free 
Exercise Clause,162 and it fails because first, the government did not prove that 
this prohibition constitutes the less restrictive means, and second, the 
distinction between “common sense business” reasons and religious reasons 
contradicts “the government’s compelling interest argument.”163 
 As it has been shown, almost every state has some conscience 
protection legislation.  Conscientious objection protection is still limited, as 
most of the current statutes only refer to sterilization procedures and abortion 
without covering other procedures to which one might object under religious or 
moral beliefs.  Examples include contraceptives, abortifacients, decisions about 
assisted suicide and euthanasia, biotechnologies, and research including human 
cloning and destruction of embryonic stem cells.164  In most cases, the statutes 
do not include general definitions of “health care providers”, although some of 
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them refer to pharmacies or pharmacists whereas others can be read in a 
broader way.  As a consequence, the statutes exclude from protection 
professionals or payers who object to support activities that violate their 
conscience.165  The lack of clear definitions gives a broader scope for 
limitations by administrative authorities and by the judiciary.  
 Despite these deficiencies, the statutes are valuable tools for the 
protection of conscientious refusals.  Especially helpful are the ones that grant 
health care providers a right of action against those who discriminate or force 
them to act against their conscience, complementing the federal legislation and 
regulation in the field.166  Nevertheless, they do not necessarily give an answer 
to all conscientious objection concerns.  Promoting state law that supplements 
the general protection of federal law can serve as a model that can be applied 
to other federal systems.  Although the powers of the autonomous communities 
in Spain are not as extensive as the ones of the states in the United States, for 
these purposes, it is possible to consider Spain as a federal system.167  The 
state statutes can shed light on the definitions and enforcement mechanisms 
that can be included in this type of norm. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Scholars and legal systems at the international and domestic levels have 
recognized the protection of conscientious objection.  The problem arises when 
we question the rationale behind this protection.  
International human rights have widely guaranteed freedom of 
conscience, including the protection of conscientious objection in specific 
matters.  At the national level, countries such as Spain and Germany recognize 
conscientious objection in relation to freedom of religious clauses but only for 
cases involving military service.  The judiciary, however, has expanded this 
constitutional protection to other subject matters.  Nevertheless, the recognition 
of a general constitutional right to conscientious objection is still contested.  
The case of the United States is slightly different.  Although the First 
Amendment of the Constitution does not explicitly recognize the freedom of 
conscience and conscientious objection, this Article tries to prove that these 
rights could be included in the Free Exercise Clause.  The American 
difficulties in this area should encourage States with explicit recognition of 
freedom of conscience to strengthen this protection in order to resolve new 
conscientious objection cases.  The recognition of constitutional foundations is 
especially relevant when dealing with conflicts between conscientious 
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objection and other rights or public interests.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
foundation for conscientious objection can be developed under the 
fundamental right to respect for private and family life present in several 
foreign countries’ constitutions and international treaties.  
 One of the fields where new cases are constantly arising is the area of 
health care providers.  Although it is possible to imagine conscience problems 
in all types of jobs, it is also true that many controversies that come to mind are 
related to the medical field.  Activities in this area are constantly in contact 
with fundamental values, such as life, sexuality, and health.  Many different 
religious tenets or ethical principles deal in one way or another with these 
topics.  As a result, professionals in these fields, precisely because of their 
work, are more exposed to conscience problems and, therefore, need special 
protection of their right to freedom of conscience.  In Spain, it was the central 
legislature that gave the basic norm regarding the issue whereas the local 
legislation, administrative regulations, and judicial interpretation are still 
maturing.  The complex multilevel protection of the United States can shed 
some light for further developments in other countries.  
 The Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Statutes’ 
focus on non-discrimination aspects of conscientious objection can be 
developed through local legislation in Spain.  The statutes of autonomous 
communities can also complement the protection of general legislation by 
giving broad definitions and enforcement mechanisms.  Nevertheless, the 
experience of some state statutes in the United States and administrative norms 
also shows that regulations can end up restricting the right to conscientious 
objection excessively.  Therefore, a mixed model that includes administrative 
regulations proceedings can be helpful to avoid the overflow of the judiciary, 
provided there is always some judicial mechanism available to correct possible 
arbitrariness of the administration.  In other words, it is essential that an 
adequate mechanism of judicial review of both regulations and legislation is 
available. 
 The endless scenarios where conscientious objection can be invoked 
make it impossible for the legislature to anticipate all types of cases, calling for 
an active role of the judiciary.  The case law regarding the American Federal 
Statutes reminds us that general protection remains incomplete unless an 
express right of action is given.  In those cases, it would be the task of the 
judiciary to give an adequate interpretation of the norms when dealing with 
conflicts between the rights of the workers and other public interests.  The use 
of general, non-discriminatory norms and labor law, such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, can give complementary protection to health care providers.  
The same can be said of general actions protecting fundamental rights.  It is 
especially relevant that judges take into account the close link between 
conscientious objection and the constitutional protection of freedom of 
conscience.  
 
 
